Turkey's presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for May 14th, 2023, and may be the most consequential of the year.
The nation's democracy is deeply flawed, with some commentators concerned that it will slide into a full-blown dictatorship. Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has grown more autocratic during his time in power — by co-opting legal institutions, distorting the media, and harassing opponents — leading many commentators to speculate that Erdoğan will not respect the election result if he loses.
If he does lose (and steps down), a change of leader would have large and far-reaching effects. Due to Erdoğan’s absurd belief that high central bank interest rates cause inflation (when they are in fact a critical tool for taming it), the rate of inflation has been twice that of wage increases. According to Turkey’s central bank, inflation stood at 43.7% in April. This is already the second-highest level in the G20, yet some forecasters expect this official figure is an intentional underestimate.
Additionally, the result of the election is set to determine events outside of Turkey’s borders, affecting both the future of Syria’s ongoing civil war and Sweden’s chances of joining NATO.
Will Erdoğan win? 55%
Polls show that Erdoğan is facing a close contest with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Nation Alliance’s presidential candidate. However, poll results fluctuate wildly, as polling in Turkey is not particularly reliable, and our forecasters are wary about putting too much weight on them.
Many citizens were disillusioned with the government after its perceived failings in response to the huge earthquake that struck Turkey in February, but forecasters do not expect this to affect outcomes as much as recent sentiment would suggest. The topic is fading out of political discourse and most of the displaced will need to return home in order to vote (and those who stayed put are presumed to be older voters that are more likely to vote for Erdoğan).
While betting market odds imply an Erdoğan loss is likely, none of our forecasters gave more than a 50% chance of this outcome. The aggregate of our forecasts comes to 55%. One forecaster explains why:
With almost all commentary and polls saying this is a dead heat, with more tools at his disposal to help ease a victory, I think Erdoğan has a slight advantage (despite the inflation situation and the aftermath of the earthquake). Despite countries such as Germany limiting polling stations for Turks abroad, the majority of the voters who could be affected by polling "irregularities" are obviously based in Turkey.
As it is expected the election will go to the second round, there will be more time for Erdoğan to influence the situation at the polls.
Given the economic conditions, this election should be an easy win for the opposition. One forecaster would give Ekrem Imamoglu, the Istanbul mayor who has been barred from running, a 75% chance of winning if he were in the race. However, as things stand, there is little that unites the coalition beyond opposing the incumbent, and their candidate Kılıçdaroğlu is broadly regarded as lacking charisma.
Erdoğan is already doing what he can to tilt the odds further in his favour by arresting social media users who post “provocative” content, controlling the media, and using the courts to prevent potential challengers from standing for office.
Additionally, apart from its high inflation, the Turkish economy is not looking all bad. As they avoided fully participating in Western sanctions against Russia, Turkey’s economy has been buoyed by the high levels of foreign investment from Russian businesses and cheaper fuel. Employment levels are improving, too, with the unemployment rate at 10%, down from pre-pandemic levels of around 14%.
Foul play?
The president’s ability to affect the electoral process is clearly dominant in forecasters’ thinking:
I updated from 48% to 59%. In a fair vote count and election day process I'd give Erdoğan a 45% chance. That is counting his ability to use the government and media to his advantage, and exert pressure, but not outright violence at the polls. Erdoğan showed in his response to the 2016 odd coup that he is willing to go far beyond norms and the rule of law. Even his dictatorial suppression across the street from the Turkish Embassy in DC in 2017, including having his guards fight the US Secret Service, are not indicators of a person likely to follow the rules.
This all begs the question: will Erdoğan resort to ballot stuffing? Will he step down if the results do not turn out in his favour? We will be publishing our forecasts on the likelihood of these questions, as well as what we expect to change under a different leader, over the next week.